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Abstract 
This paper explores the ways in which attachment disruptions might increase 
the risk of adult religious psychopathology by drawing parallels between the 
possible symbolisms lying behind religious violence and the concept of 
attachment. It is first argued that the relationship between a religious believer 
and a religious figure can be explained as an attachment experience. Secondly, 
it is proposed that when a religious attachment figure becomes a target of 
slander, or an action is perpetrated to disrupt the bond with such a figure, the 
religious believer may be predisposed to defensive, adaptive reactions, in the 
form of protest, despair, or detachment, to protect their attachment bond and 
resolve the disruptions that threaten their religious attachment identity. 
Support for this theoretical proposition was obtained through discourse 
analyses of three case examples (Charlie Hebdo vs al-Qaeda, Boko Haram vs 
the Nigerian government, and Pastor Terry Jones vs Islamic radicalisation), 
which position attachment theory as an alternative explanatory framework for 
conceptualising religious violence as a form of religious attachment-
psychopathology—aimed at safeguarding the affectional bond with a religious 
figure from whom one may have developed a sense of identity and safe haven.  
 
Keywords: attachment theory, defensive responses, adult religious 
psychopathology, terrorism, al-Qaeda vs Charlie Hebdo, Boko Haram vs 
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Introduction 
Attachment theory conceptualises the provision of security by a primary 
caregiver to an infant as imperative for enhancing the infant’s chances of 
survival (Bowlby 1969). This is because infants have a universal need of 
attachment with their primary caregivers when distressed and in need of care. 
As infants advance in life and become adults, future attachments may be 
formed with other substitute caregivers that satisfy their basic attachment needs 
and contribute to the development of identity (Ainsworth et al. 1978; 
Campbell, Adams, Dobson, 1984). As a behavioural system, attachment 
enables one to develop the trust, industry, autonomy, and implicit knowledge 
to deal with the threats to self that often accompany an identity formation 
process (Lapsley, Rice & FitzGerald 1990), especially in religious situations. 
Research on individual differences in adult attachment processes have 
provided the basis for examining the relationship between lifespan attachment 
development and religious fundamentalism (Mickelson et al. 1997; Leonard et 
al. 2013), showing how followers of a religion can ascribe to an ideology 
because of the psychological benefits it can afford them in dealing with issues 
of insecurity in real life. Although most fundamentalist ideologies may be 
related to religious prejudice and psychological benefits (Brandt & Van 
Tongeren 2015; Brandt & Renya 2010; Wood, 2010), the extent to which such 
ideology and benefits are internalised and interpreted based on attachment 
needs remain unclear. This way of thinking about religious psychopathology 
as a conceptualisation of religious violence (also see Kashima 2016; Saroglou 
2016), can provide some insights into the potential of examining religious-
related conflicts through psychological lenses.  
In this paper, a theoretical exploration of attachment perspective on 
religious psychopathology is presented with an interest in religious conflict 
and/or violence. Acts of religious violence are conceptualised as responses that 
involve a religious attachment-psychopathology that is moderated by a large 
scale of psychological, biological, and socio-cultural factors. Following a brief 
theoretical introduction of basic attachment concepts, the paper offers case 
examples demonstrating that re-enactments of attachment may be associated 
with religious violence, and that understanding the nature of attachment 
processes is as important as addressing the issue of religious psychopathology 
being discussed. This was achieved by employing a discourse analysis which 
ensures a constant interplay between texts (interviews with selected groups, 
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documents, and available literature), discourse (set of possible statements), and 
context (the social and historical settings of the events). Data information on 
Al Qaeda, Boko Haram, and Pastor Terry Jones were obtained and used as case 
examples for the discourse analysis since they are mainstream cases that more 
richly illustrate how attachment processes in religious situations can be used to 
explain religious psychopathology. The selected case examples were analysed 
based on eight-steps proposed for conducting discourse analysis: identifying a 
theory (conceptualising an idea of what might be happening), 
operationalisation (how the adapted theories translate their claims into an 
overall framework), sampling (analysis of three cases), collecting evidence of 
interviews (through online platforms and public statements by selected 
groups), transcribing interview statements, member check (confirming 
statements via a third party using available references that have analysed 
similar data), analysis of the sets of texts collected, and debriefing (being open 
to other empirical data and juxtaposing common understandings on the topic 
with other broader contexts) (Bondarouk & Ruël 2004).  
By employing the discourse analytical method, this paper starts by 
conceptualising attachment-religion aspects as the conceptual basis for 
explaining acts of religious violence as defensive, adaptive reactions employed 
in dealing with the fear of losing the attachment bond1 (with a religious figure) 
upon which an identity has been formed. This attachment theoretical discourse 
on religious violence invites scholars to consider attachment with religious 
figures as a mobilising bond with much broader religious implications. And 
thus, argues that acts of religious violence are carried out by people who are in 
defence of their religious figure, one that is often perceived as a symbolic 
attachment figure, providing a sense of comfort, security, and meaning for the 
religious believer. This attachment figure, as reasoned in the subsequent 
sections of this paper, may take the form of a divine entity, a spiritual leader, a 
religious figure, a religious charismatic personality, a sacred object, or sacred 
texts perceived as part of identity.  
 
                                                          
1 In attachment theory, ‘an attachment is an affectional bond, as is the 
caregiving bond. Thus, [an individual] develops an attachment bond with their 
attachment figure and the caregiver develops a caregiving bond with the 
[individual]’ (Prior & Glaser 2006, p.57). 
Attachment Theory and Religious Violence 
 
 
 
81 
Attachment Theory and the Search for a Religious 
Attachment Figure  
Over the past three decades, attachment theory has been applied to understand 
human behaviour and how individual differences in social contexts are the 
product of relationships with primary caregivers. At the conception of his 
attachment theory, John Bowlby (1958; 1969; 1973; 1977) sought to explain 
the evolutionary process that binds infants to their caregivers. He then 
formulated the basic tenets of attachment theory, viewing attachment as a 
strong, enduring emotional bond that connects two relational partners across 
time and space. This early contact experience with a primary caregiver forms 
what Bowlby calls ‘internal working models’ which are mental representations 
of self and others that influence the character of and expectations from future 
social relationships with attachment figures. The initial idea of attachment 
theory was later developed by Ainsworth (1973) and her colleagues 
(Ainsworth et al. 1978) who advanced the attachment framework as a system 
for evaluating parent-child relationships. From their Strange Situation 
research, Ainsworth (1973) and colleagues (Ainsworth et al. 1978) formulated 
three different categories of attachment styles. The first is the secure 
attachment style in which infants are distressed upon the unavailability of 
primary caregivers but comforted when in close proximity with them. The 
second attachment style, known as the anxious-ambivalent, illustrates how 
infants are greatly distressed upon the departures and return of their primary 
caregivers. The third pattern of attachment, anxious-avoidant, saw infants 
unbothered about the unavailability or availability of their primary caregivers. 
Main and Solomon (1986; 1990) later identified the disorganised attachment 
style, a fourth pattern, in which infants seemed disoriented and confused about 
attachment-seeking, as they exhibited tendencies of both anxious and avoidant 
styles (cf. Hart, Limke, Budd 2010). Regardless of the style, Bowlby’s 
attachment theory was developed to elucidate the 
 
kernels of truth in Freud’s insights about close relationships by 
replacing his image of a needy, dependent infant motivated by drive 
reduction with one of a sophisticated, competence-motivated infant 
using its primary caregiver as a secure base from which to explore 
and, when necessary, as a haven of safety and a source of comfort 
(Waters & Cummings 2000:165).  
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The ability to perform the role of a secure base and a safe haven in times of 
distress and exploration makes a primary caregiver an important force in an 
infant’s life, from which separation would have negative consequences that 
could lead to any of the insecure attachment styles listed above. Ideally, the 
primary caregiver provides the infant with a sense of security and awareness 
in their exploration of the world around them, as they develop their identity 
and model themselves in association with their caregiver.  
Over the years, the idea of an ‘attachment caregiver’ or ‘attachment 
figure’ has evolved with several researchers applying the concept to mean an 
object of attachment that satisfies the emotional needs of infants, adolescents, 
or adults. In particular, Haven and Shaver (1987), and many other researchers, 
have demonstrated that individual differences in adult attachment processes 
seem to correlate with that of childhood attachments. It is on this ground that 
Kirkpatrick and Shaver (1990) conceptualised a theory of attachment-religion 
aspects in which they positioned the concept of God (as a generic term that is 
not restricted to any religion) as an ultimate object of attachment, arguing that 
attachment theory provides us with a useful framework for understanding 
religious belief and behaviour. The obvious starting point for the religious 
attachment argument is that one of the central tenets in most monotheistic 
religions is the belief in a personal God or religious figure (e.g. Jesus, God, 
Jehovah, Mary, Allah, Buddha, Brahma, Jedi, or other forms of figures in new 
age spiritualities) with whom the follower has a personal relationship in 
everyday life. The idea of having ‘a relationship with God’ resonates well 
among religious adherents when compared with other statements of faith 
(Gallup & Jones 1989). Religion connotes an idea of ‘being bound’ with the 
divine (Ferm 1945), a connection that Kirkpatrick (1998) has linked to the 
attachment working model developed with a primary caregiver from which 
the individual explores future (religious-related) relationships.  
Cicirelli (2004) has expanded this idea in his consideration of lifespan 
attachments, even though he noted that Weiss (1986) has contested such 
framework, arguing that attachment processes decline as infants reach 
adolescence and strive for autonomy. Weiss contends that infants retain their 
residual attachment to the primary caregiver which then continues throughout 
their adult lifespan in a way that makes the primary caregiver to remain an 
irreplaceable caregiver. However, Cicirelli (1991a; 1991b) has maintained 
that when adults are separated from their primary caregivers for a long period, 
a surrogate attachment figure emerges as part of the working model where the 
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adult becomes drawn to an object of attachment that represents the primary 
caregiver. This symbolic attachment motivates adults to develop religious 
beliefs in which they perceive a relationship with God or a religious figure as 
a symbolic attachment - exhibiting attachment religious behaviour in the form 
of prayer, devotion to a sacred space, reading religious texts, rituals, and so 
on, to maintain the relationship (Williams & Watts 2014; Ellison et al. 2015; 
Counted & Watts 2017). This symbolic attachment is a representation of a 
primary caregiver who is unavailable to the individual. It is reasoned that in 
the view that God takes the position of a surrogate attachment in the absence 
of the primary caregiver, an attachment-religion connection is developed 
because of the role played by God as the safe haven and secure base in the 
absence of the primary caregiver. On this ground, it is suggested that divine 
entities, religious figures, or religious objects could be perceived as symbolic 
attachment caregivers by religious followers who perceive them as sources of 
support and security.  
Considerable evidence supports the attachment-religion hypothesis in 
the study of psychology of religion (cf. Granqvist & Kirkpatrick 2016; 
Granqvist, Hagekull, & Ivarsson 2012; Granqvist, Mikulincer, Gewirtz & 
Shaver 2012; Granqvist, Mikulincer & Shaver 2010; Granqvist, Ljungdahl, 
Dickie 2007; Cicirelli 2004; Kirkpatrick 1992), supporting the idea that 
religion, in terms of having a relationship with God, fulfills both the safe 
haven and secure base functions of attachment processes. This way of thinking 
about religion in terms of believer-God relationship is rooted in the idea that 
adult attachment development with invisible divine entities or religious 
figures is possible due to increased cognitive abilities in adults (Bretherton 
1987). Unlike infants who require steady physical interaction to develop 
attachment bonds with their primary caregivers, older children and adults have 
a much stronger cognitive capacity which allows them to maintain 
attachments through verbal and visual connections with their representative 
abstract, anthropomorphic figures, even in religious situations (Granqvist & 
Kirkpatrick 2016). Adults can therefore depend upon the knowledge of the 
whereabouts of their religious figures for their attachment satisfaction. This 
was amplified in the work of Sroufe and Waters (1977), who argued that the 
goal of adult attachment is the need for ‘felt security’. According to Sroufe 
and Waters, this need can be met in adult attachment processes, and in 
particular through a relationship with a religious figure who is not physically 
visible but felt by religious adults.  
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Psychology of religion researchers (e.g. Granqvist & Hagekull 1999; 
Hall et al. 2009; Augustyn et al. 2016; Counted 2016a; Granqvist & 
Kirkpatrick 2016) classify the individual differences in attachment-religion 
hypothesis into several hypotheses: the compensation hypothesis (in which an 
individual develops an attachment to a religious figure or to a mystical 
experience as a way of compensating for the emotional separation from their 
primary caregiver), and the correspondence hypothesis (in which the religious 
believer seeks attachment with a religious caregiver as a security-enhancing 
figure while maintaining their relationship with other human caregivers) 
(Granqvist & Kirkpatrick 2016). These different classifications of implicit 
attachments suggest a search for a religious attachment figure and a desire to 
have attachment with a religious caregiver. Counted (2016a:167) describes 
this kind of religious aspect as a ‘care-giving faith’ experience in which ‘the 
young person emphasizes the importance of needing care and emotional 
support in their faith experience’. 
The need for meaningful symbolic attachment can be the driving force 
behind gaining social experiences that begin early in life and continue into 
adulthood. Attachment is from the cradle to the grave and is one specific 
aspect of a believer-God relationship, or a care-giving faith experience, with 
its purpose being to provide the believer with a sense of security and comfort, 
as in the case of a parent-child relationship experience. Hence, it is argued that 
the same panoply of ideas that applies to the attachment between a parent and 
an infant could be applied in relationships with religious objects of attachment, 
since the primary aim of these relationships is to develop proximity to a 
reliable source that can bring hope, meaning, and security in times of danger 
and during individual growth.  
The power of attachment lies in an intermediate, abstract area of the 
human experience that is in-between space, in a ‘transitional’ world. This very 
phenomenon of ‘in-betweenness’ speaks of a transitional world of attachment-
caregiving bond, holding out the promise that needs for meaningful 
connection and security, despite the challenges of life, can be met (Winnicott 
1953). In this transitional world, the needs for care and support are met by a 
‘stronger’ and much ‘wiser’ relational other, as the human person comes to 
terms with who they are in connection with the relational other. The loss of 
attachment between relational objects in this transitional world could trigger 
reactionary emotions of fear and insecurity, and the possibility or risk of 
turning to unhealthy behavioural patterns to deal with such a loss. Attachment 
Attachment Theory and Religious Violence 
 
 
 
85 
theory therefore offers a promising alternative framework for understanding 
how relationship problems in Winnicott’s transitional world are acted out in 
the physical realm by externalising violence in both public and sacred spaces, 
as will be made clearer in the next section.  
 
 
Attachment Theory and Religious Psychopathology  
While the attachment bond developed with a religious caregiving figure can 
be positive, its loss can be the worst thing imaginable and can have a negative 
effect on both identity and individual security. And yet, attachment separation 
and/or disruption can happen again and again throughout life in varying 
circumstances. For some it could be the loss of an attachment figure through 
a tragic death, while others may experience attachment separation through 
caregiver unavailability or abandonment (Counted 2016a; 2016b; Howard et 
al. 2011; Lowenstein 2007; Liotti 2004). Cicirelli (2004:372) reasons that 
another important aspect of adult attachment development is ‘the desire to 
protect the existence of an elderly mother [a primary caregiver] by providing 
physical care in order to preserve this unique attachment figure’. As discussed 
in the previous section, Cicirelli argues that a symbolic attachment in the form 
of a relationship with God can assume the representation of a parental 
attachment in which God is perceived by the individual as a safe haven and 
secure base in the absence of a primary caregiver.  
 
Although God is an intangible entity believed to exist by members of 
a religious community, by analogy, individuals with an attachment to 
God would have the desire to protect their belief about the existence 
of God by vigorously defending or justifying this belief if challenged 
by outsiders. (Whether or not God actually exists independent of such 
beliefs is a philosophical issue and not the focus or concern of 
psychological studies.) (Cicirelli 2004:372).  
 
Cicirelli’s contention seems to draw some parallels with the work of Kobak 
and colleagues on attachment disruption and psychopathology. Drawing from 
Bowlby’s (1973) Separation volume in his trilogy on attachment theory, 
Kobak, Zajac, and Madsen (2016) developed an attachment theoretical model 
for understanding psychopathology in which they suggested that the 
monitoring of the caregiver’s whereabouts and their physical proximity to a 
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receiver of attachment is an expanded view on attachment processes. Kobak 
and colleagues (2016:26) reason that this theoretical development accounts 
for the contribution of attachment processes to personality development, 
psychopathology, and defensive processes which shift ‘attention from 
observing reactions to separations to observing patterns of emotional 
communication in [individual-caregiver] dyads’. Their argument was based 
on the premise that saw emotionally attuned communication in attachment 
processes as the central fulcrum for maintaining secure attachment bonds. In 
other words, reactions to prolonged separation from an attachment figure 
would imply that the central goal of the attachment system is the monitoring 
of caregiver proximity and responsiveness (Sroufe & Waters 1977). Empirical 
observations from Bowlby, Roberton, and Rosenbluth (1952) and Ainsworth 
(1962) show that infants, for example, monitor the responsiveness and 
availability of their caregivers, especially their ability to support, protect and 
provide for them during moments of danger and distress.  
Bowlby and colleagues (1952) share the story of a 2-year-old girl who 
spent 8 days in hospital away from her mother for a minor operation. 
However, throughout the time of her separation experience, the little girl 
Laura was observed fretting and displaying separation anxiety while 
monitoring the responsiveness of the mother. This observation of reactions to 
attachment separation later provided the context for exploring how the 
displays of ‘protest’, ‘despair’, and ‘detachment’ had to be interpreted as 
emotional signals that suggest how attached individuals ‘monitor danger in 
the environment, explore new learning opportunities, and... social exchanges’ 
(Kobak, Zajac & Madsen 2016:27). In the later pages of their chapter, Kobak 
and colleagues conceptualised separation experience as a form of ‘attachment 
disruption’ in which responses to it can be analysed in terms of protest, 
despair, and detachment, which were positioned as the three phases of infants’ 
defensive reactions to prolonged separation from a caregiver.  
According to Kobak and colleagues, the protest phase starts the 
moment the caregiver switches off communication with the infant, which sees 
infant signaling their separation distress through crying loudly, following the 
caregiver, showing anger, or pounding the door, as seen in the observation of 
Bowlby, Roberton, and Rosenbluth (1952). At the first phase, the child is 
optimistic about having the caregiver back while displaying dominant 
emotions such as fear, anger, and distress. However, in the despair phase 
which succeeds protest, the infant is most likely to be withdrawn. At this phase 
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the infant interprets the separation experience as a loss of the attachment figure 
(Kobak, Zajac & Madsen 2016), showing what Bowlby (1973) calls ‘deep 
mourning’, and in some cases showing signs of sadness and agony. Heinicke 
and Westheimer (1966) reasoned that it is also possible to observe hostile 
behavioural patterns, directed toward other kids or things that reminds them 
of the caregiver, during this second phase of defensive reaction. Detachment 
marks the final phase of the defensive mechanism to which the infant shows 
positive attitudes toward alternative caregivers as a way of surviving in the 
environment. Bowlby (1973) describes these defensive processes as the 
ethological approach to human fear, highlighting how prolonged threats and 
disruptions to caregiver proximity could contribute to negative interpersonal 
expectancies and anxious attachment patterns which are internalised as 
working models that increase the risk of adult psychopathology. Kobak and 
colleagues corroborate this knowledge paradigm, reasoning that the disruption 
of attachment processes and threats to caregiver proximity can have 
significant impact on the individual person. Solomon and George (2011) 
conducted similar studies on caregiver responsiveness and disorganised 
attachment, describing the response of the infant to the prolonged failure of 
their caregiver responsiveness as caregiver abdication. The concept of 
caregiver abdication was used to describe the breakdown in the attachment 
bond that includes frightening and starving the infant of attachment and the 
response of the infant to a failure to protect them. The concept of caregiver 
abdication can be applicable to the concept of attachment disruption and 
psychopathology, especially in cases where the individual is reacting because 
of threats to caregiver sensitivity and responsiveness. Caregiver abdication in 
adults can also be portrayed in a religious attachment relationship by 
defending the religious figure from perceived harm or threats of attachment 
disruptions.  
Attachment disruptions are ‘prolonged or severe threats to a 
caregiver’s availability or responsiveness that create fundamental fear and 
uncertainty about the caregiver’s availability or capacity to respond in 
moments of danger’ (Kobak, Zajac & Madsen 2016:28). When such 
disruptions are not addressed or remain unrepaired, the individual may 
become vulnerable to persistent feelings of anxiety, fear, sadness, and anger; 
thus, developing defensive, reparative strategies and prejudices in the form of 
protest, despair, and detachment that serve to restore confidence in the 
attachment bond. These defensive processes also reduce ‘the individual’s 
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ability to engage in emotionally attuned communication with caregivers’ (p. 
28). Kobak and colleagues view this emerging perspective as a paradigm shift 
in attachment research which shifts focus on children’s separations from 
parents to more broader investigations that examine the quality of emotional 
communication in adult attachment processes. Attachment theory provides a 
blueprint for understanding how stressful moments in the form of attachment 
disruptions or separation experience can predispose a person to elicit 
dysfunctional emotional defenses and responses that are only symptomatic 
expressions of the need for attachment proximity and desire to resolve threats 
to the attachment bond (Kobak, Zajac & Madsen 2016).  
In extension, it is argued that threats to the attachment bond in a 
relationship between a religious believer and a religious figure can initiate 
defensive processes that aid in coping with the reality of religious attachment 
disruptions. Hence, disrupting the attachment processes in relationship 
experiences with religious attachment figures may as well become the genesis 
of adult religious psychopathology, especially in aspects of religious violence 
that are often interpreted as protest, despair, and detachment. There are two 
main reasons for this assumption. Firstly, because the attachment system is 
one that is emotionally attuned to monitor the availability and proximity of the 
(religious) attachment figure. Hence, in a situation where a relationship with 
a religious figure is under threat, or the emotional bond disrupted, this 
separation experience may initiate reparative, defensive processes that are 
motivated by a desire to re-establish closeness with the religious figure and 
restore confidence in the relationship. Secondly, an attachment theoretical 
perspective on religious violence is proposed because differences in identity 
development are often formed based on attachment expectations. Several 
studies have shown evidence of our second assumption on the relationship 
between emotional attachment and identity status (Campbell, Adams, Dobson 
1984; Berzonsky & Neimeyer 1994), supporting the conceptualisation of 
identity as a psychosocial, attachment development (Erikson 1956). Studies 
suggest that individuals with secure attachments show a willingness to 
construct their identity based on the values of those around them, particularly 
their attachment figures, whereas those with insecure attachments tend to 
procrastinate in the process of identity formation. Identity can be interpreted 
in terms of emotionally attuned communications in attachment dyads as the 
receiver of attachment models their identity based on the values of the 
caregiver, as evidenced in the work of Berman and colleagues (2004; 2006).  
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A religious follower is likely to model their identity and perception of 
self based on the values of the religious attachment figure to whom they are 
devoted. For example, a Christian is likely to model the life and teachings of 
Jesus Christ. The same way a devout Muslim may form his or her identity 
based on the teachings of Prophet Mohammed. Hence, at moments of 
attachment disruptions with the religious figure, the religious believer may 
become predisposed to defensive strategies that eliminate the possibility of 
losing their identity and the attachment bond with the religious figure. This 
can come in the form of desiring to hold on to the feelings of security and 
identity that they have in their religious figure or in their religious beliefs in 
order to achieve happiness and maintain their secure attachment bonds. Thus, 
identity becomes embedded in the relationship with the religious figure or to 
whatever sacred object that represents a connection to such mystical 
experience. If identity is shaped around a religious attachment figure, then the 
natural response is to defend it and maintain the attachment bond with such 
an object. To do so, Soltis (1983) reasons in his ‘exploitable weakness 
principle’ that there is benefit in exploiting the weakness of the opposing force 
which is seeking to disrupt the bond that has been developed with such a 
significant object. As a result, a protective force is formed around the object 
of attachment as arguments in support of the object are put forward on its 
behalf to defend it (Ruiz 2013).  
It is reasoned then that when a religious figure is experienced as a safe 
haven the individual may turn to such a figure for protection, wisdom, or hope 
in times of danger the same way a child would run to a mother for such 
affordances. However, when a religious figure is perceived as a secure base 
the individual may represent themselves or explore the world based on how 
they see the figure. In these two scenarios, the religious figure becomes an 
object for identity formation and for exploring the world; the same way a child 
would look up to a primary caregiver to frame the way they see themselves 
and the environment. When a religious attachment figure becomes a reliable 
safe haven and secure base, much is needed to guard this unique experience. 
An object of attachment is easily recognised as such, especially when there is 
the fear of losing it. The fear of losing an attachment can be associated with 
an individual’s internal working models and the extent to which such 
individual can manage attachment insecurity. This varies from person to 
person and often has a lot to do with how a primary caregiver was experienced. 
The possibility of change may make it impossible to hold on to a particular 
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attachment object or caregiver for a lifetime. Change is a fact of life: 
relationships may end, friends may be lost, faith may fade, places of belonging 
may be abandoned, old age advance, a loved carer may die, and so forth. 
Evaluation of objects of attachment provides an indication of the identity 
shaped around them. The fear of losing the attachment bond and identity with 
a religious figure can cause extreme reactions in some religious believers, as 
they fight to both defend and protect that which means much to them.  
People are likely to defend their objects of attachment because their 
identity is shaped by the objects. This, I believe, is what members of militant 
religious groups do when they claim allegiance to religious figures that are 
representations of their symbolic attachments. It is not only the figures that 
they are defending but also their own attachment identity. Thus, religious 
violence may be interpreted on the one hand as defending an attachment 
identity that has been formed through a religious figure, and on the other, 
securing the attachment bond with a religious figure that is under attack. 
Hence, these two interpretative pathways may be the mechanisms linking 
religious violence to adult attachment-psychopathology. Having established 
that an individual can develop an attachment bond and identity with a religious 
figure who is perceived as being a haven of safety (one to whom they turn to 
in times of distress) and a secure base (one from whom they develop identity 
and explore the world of danger), what then can be said about the forces that 
might seek to destroy such a bond? Should such forces be perceived as a threat 
by the recipient of the caregiving? If so, is the establishment of a protective 
defence mechanism against these forces justifiable, given that the fight is one 
of identity, and failure to protect it could mean losing sense of self? In order 
to challenge the way we think about religious violence, the subsequent 
paragraphs will build up on the already established arguments, while also 
drawing on empirical insights to elucidate and clarify the theoretical 
propositions on religious attachment-psychopathology.  
 
 
Case Examples of Defensive Responses to Religious 
Attachment Disruptions  
Although it is reasonable to see religious violence as a struggle between two 
conflicting groups, it is also important not to ignore that the subliminal 
grievances of protest, despair, and detachment on the part of the perpetrator 
could be because of the interpretations provided in the previous section. Adult 
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religious psychopathology in terms of religious violence has been 
conceptualised as defensive responses arising, over time, due to the fear of 
losing an attachment bond and the identity developed thereof. In the next 
sections, three case examples are used to illustrate the problem of religious 
violence from the perspective of the perpetrators as a vulnerable group, 
defending and protecting their objects of attachment from which they 
experience a safe haven and secure base.  
 
 
Charlie Hebdo versus the Al-Qaeda Islamic Group 
Charlie Hebdo is a controversial and nonconformist newspaper known for 
featuring cartoons, reports, and jokes reflecting the magazine’s irreverent, anti-
religious stance on sensitive issues that often make fun of Catholicism, Islam, 
Judaism, and various other institutions while at the same time sharing local and 
international news. Charlie Hebdo’s cartoonists are widely celebrated for 
attacking political and religious institutions without mercy, often crudely. The 
senior editor of Charlie Hebdo, George Biard, once said that ‘Attacking all 
religions is the basis of our identity’ (Murray 2015). In 2006, several Islamic 
organisations sued the Charlie Hebdo newspaper for re-publishing the 
Jyllands-Posten (a Danish newspaper) caricature of Muhammad, but they were 
unsuccessful. Charlie Hebdo published a similar satirical cartoon of 
Muhammad later in 2011, which according to some was a forbidden depiction 
of the Islamic religious figure in some interpretations of Islam (cf. BBC News 
2011). In response, the newspaper was firebombed and attacked; their website 
was also hacked (Boxel 2011). This protest phase continued between the news 
agency and the Islamic communities who were against the satire of their 
religious figure with placards saying ‘Behead those who insult Islam’, ‘The 
future must not belong to those who slander the prophet of Islam’, ‘Be prepared 
for the real holocaust’, and ‘Freedom go to hell’, among others. In 2012, similar 
publication made its way again to public light via Charlie Hebdo, this time, 
publishing several cartoons and nude caricatures of Muhammad. This came at 
a time when there were several attacks on the United States’ foreign missions 
in the Middle East. Vinocur (2012) believes that these attacks were linked to 
the anti-Islamic film ‘Innocence of Muslims’ which spurred outrage across 
Islamic states, hence prompting the French government to close their 
embassies and foreign missions in several Muslim countries (Samuel 2012). 
As the cartoons of Muhammad sparked debate and riots within Muslim 
Victor Counted  
 
 
 
92 
communities in France and around the world, riot police surrounded the 
Charlie Hebdo’s offices to guard them against possible attacks. The intensity 
of the Muslim community outrage from around the world, at this point, could 
be conceptualised as the despair phase of their defenses as most of them seem 
to exude frustration resulting from losing hope of redeeming the integrity of 
their sacred figure, and thus came the Islamic militant al-Qaeda group 
threatening to revenge for the attack on their religious figure.  
In response to the accusations of Islamophobia, the chief editor of 
Charlie Hebdo, Stephane Charbonnier, stated in 2011, ‘We have to carry on 
until Islam has been rendered as banal as Catholicism’ (Murray 2015). In their 
despair, this response made the al-Qaeda militant group to add Stephane to 
their Most Wanted List in 2013, along with three other Danish newspaper staff 
members who caricatured Prophet Muhammad in earlier publications. In the 
early morning of Wednesday 7th January 2015, Charlie Hebdo was attacked 
by the al-Qaeda group, killing the chief editor Stephane Charbonnier and 
several other staff members. This tragic event sparked global debates over 
freedom of speech and Islamophobia, stressing the possible motive of the 
attackers, which some argued was to shut down a news agency that lampooned 
their religious attachment figure. In an online video response to the terror 
attack, Nasr al-Ansi, a top ranking al-Qaeda commander issued an official 
statement on behalf of the terrorist group citing ‘vengeance for the prophet’ as 
the reason for the attack. 
 
We, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), claim responsibility 
for this operation as vengeance for the messenger of Allah … The 
leadership of AQAP was the party that chose the target and plotted 
and financed the plan ... It was following orders by our general chief 
Ayman al-Zawahiri … The heroes were chosen and they answered the 
call … Today, the mujahideen avenge their revered prophet, and send 
the clearest message to everyone who would dare to attack Islamic 
sanctities (Nar al-Ansi 2015). 
 
Gruber (2015) reasons that the Charlie Hebdo attackers were misinformed 
about the view that images of Muhammad are banned in the Koran. The notion 
of prohibition of Muhammad’s images gained ground among Islamic 
fundamentalist groups, even though it was only intended to discourage 
Muslims from practicing idolatry (Burke 2015). Nonetheless, while it is 
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necessary to debate what might have caused the provocation of the Islamic 
militant community, one can see that the caricature of their religious figure 
was not perceived as a friendly gesture, but rather was seen, as Nar al-Ansi 
puts it, ‘an attack on Islamic sanctities’ and a threat to undermine their source 
of attachment and Islamic identity. The slander of a religious figure, as seen 
in the case of Charlie Hebdo and al-Qaeda, is an example of how a caricature 
of an object of attachment, to which a group turns to for the construction of 
their identity, can trigger negative, defensive emotions and prejudices in the 
form of protest and despair toward others, arising both because of identity-
threat and threats to a safe haven and secure base. One could argue then that 
the final stage of defensive responses to attachment disruptions, which is the 
detachment phase, was not observed in the al-Qaeda and Charlie Hebdo case 
example. Observing for detachment would mean that the religious believers 
show positive attitudes toward alternative religious ‘caregivers’, in this case 
turning to another religious figure, as a way of surviving and coping with the 
attachment disruptions.  
 
 
Boko Haram versus the Nigerian Government  
Boko Haram is another Islamic militant group in northern Nigeria that claims 
to pursue the aim of establishing a pure Islamic state in Nigeria, one that is 
governed by Sharia law (Walker 2012). This kind of rhetoric is like that used 
to disseminate the Jihadi agenda by militant Islamic groups such as Al-Qaeda, 
ISIS, and al-Shabaab; all of which are willing to protest in despair to defend 
the cause of their religious figure even at the expense of their own lives. While 
this pursuit is questionable in all its formulations, one cannot turn a deaf ear to 
the killings of innocent people by the Boko Haram group in many northern 
parts of Nigeria. Unfortunately, northern Nigeria has a long, sad history of riots 
and communal conflicts and outbreaks of religious violence between different 
groups, in particular among the Christian and Muslim populations, and 
between the Hausas and Fulanis (Agbiboa 2013). Although the trend of 
communal conflicts seems to be a common practice in northern Nigeria, the 
affliction brought to several northern states by the Boko Haram group took the 
world by surprise. Outside observers have now begun to take Boko Haram 
seriously with the awareness campaigns such as the #BringBackOurGirls 
movement that drew international attention to the mass killings and abductions 
of innocent communities in northern Nigeria.  
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Despite the increased insurgency by the Boko Haram group, there has 
been little explanation as to what might have caused this rise in violence. Some 
have settled for conspiracy theories suggesting that this is a power tussle to 
make governance difficult for the former President Goodluck Jonathan (2010 
- 2015), who was from the southern region. Within this purview, Mustapha 
(2014) reasons that Boko Haram could have been responding to alleged 
political marginalisation of Northerners. Others associate the insurgency and 
rise of the group to be because of poverty in northern Nigeria, and a connection 
to Al-Qaeda, as often described by former Nigerian President Jonathan as ‘an 
Al-Qaeda of West Africa’ (Irish 2014; Mustapha 2014). None of these theories 
seem to adequately explain the intentions of the Boko Haram militant group, 
nor why they would advocate for an Islamic state system.  
It is difficult to say what drives the Boko Haram group if their motives 
are not examined. The history of Boko Haram is an ambiguous one, and no one 
account is sufficient to clearly paint a picture of what is happening within this 
group. However, a helpful start would be to interpret the ethos that informs 
about what the Islamic militant group stands for. In 2011, Boko Haram came 
up with a statement of belief that can help us understand their ideology and 
demands in relation to attachment theory, as they identified themselves thus: 
 
We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out Jihad 
(religious war) in Nigeria and our struggle is based on the traditions 
of the holy prophet. We will never accept any system of government 
apart from the one stipulated by Islam because that is the only way 
that the Muslims can be liberated. We do not believe in any system of 
government, be it traditional or orthodox, except the Islamic system 
which is why we will keep on fighting against democracy, capitalism, 
socialism, and whatever. We will not allow the Nigerian Constitution 
to replace the laws that have been enshrined in the Holy Qur’an, we 
will not allow adulterated conventional education (Boko) to replace 
Islamic teachings. We will not respect the Nigerian government 
because it is illegal. We will continue to fight its military and the 
police because they are not protecting Islam. We do not believe in the 
Nigerian judicial system and we will fight anyone who assists the 
government in perpetrating illegalities (Salkida 2009). 
 
From the above statement, it appears that the Boko Haram group seems to  
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identify themselves as some sort of ‘defenders’ of the Islamic identity in their 
protest and despair. There seem to be an underlying bond with their faith and 
what it represents to them, and anyone who stands contrary to this sense of 
identity or pose a threat to their attachment identity will be targeted as the 
enemy. This form of defense seems to share similar characteristic with the 
Charlie Hebdo versus al-Qaeda case, where an obvious satire toward a 
religious figure gave rise to a negative prejudice and reactionary defensive 
responses of protest and despair that ended up in horrific terror attacks. In the 
case of Boko Haram, the terror group felt threatened by a new government 
which they claim might enforce the state constitution to ‘replace the laws that 
have been enshrined in the Holy Qur’an’ (Salkida 2009). It seems that Boko 
Haram also exhibits elements of defensive processes of protest and despair 
just as their al-Qaeda counterpart. Unfortunately, these defenses are 
demonstrated through their records of killings and attacks based on an alleged 
accusation of attachment disruptions.  
In clarifying the defensive responses of Boko Haram, Agbiboa 
(2013:4) considers the group as a ‘movement of restoration since their 
overriding goal continues to be the enforcement of Sharia [Islamic law] in 
the spirit of earlier times’. The term Boko Haram, aside its literal meaning 
(i.e. Western education is forbidden) implies some sort of resistance and 
rejection to ‘imposition of Western education and its system of colonial 
social organisation, which replaced and degraded the earlier Islamic order of 
the jihadist state’ (Isa 2010:332). Isa reasons that the system represented by 
those who have undergone western forms of education is considered secular 
and corrupt by Boko Haram, and therefore has no connection to their Islamic 
identity. Boko Haram leader, Mohammed Yusuf, once said, ‘Our land was 
an Islamic state before the colonial masters turned it to a kafir (infidel) land. 
The current system is contrary to true Islamic beliefs’ (Salkida 2009). The 
system Mohammed describes is one that he believes is mixed with issues 
that are contrary to Islamic beliefs and therefore constitutes a problem to 
their attachment bond and identity.  
While the different motives that might have given rise to the Boko 
Haram insurgency are put into consideration, it must also be noted that this 
group was a relatively small protesting fundamentalist group until the arrest 
and killing of their leader, Mohammed Yusuf, by the Nigerian security forces 
in 2009 (Umar 2011). Shortly after the killing of Mohammed Yusuf, there was 
a volcanic eruption of the Boko Haram despairing venom on the Nigerian 
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state, as they began to firebomb several strategic spots in the country to take 
revenge for the death of their leader and reinforce their attachment allegiance 
to him. Although the actions of Mohammed Yusuf might not depict the image 
of a typical religious figure to an outsider but he was, to some extent, a source 
of inspiration to those that followed him, especially among the impoverished 
and alienated members of Boko Haram ‘who were animated by deep-seated 
socio economic and political grievances, such as poor governance and elite 
corruption’ in the country (Agbiboa 2015:146).  
When viewed from the outside, it appears that the demand of Boko 
Haram for an Islamic state devoid of Western culture has to do with religious 
differences and tensions between blocs of Muslim and non-Muslim groups. 
Far from it, I argue that the Boko Haram group appears to be protecting their 
objects of attachment, whether it is their sacred book (Koran) or their group’s 
religious and/or political figure (in the person of Mohammed Yusuf), to which 
they have forged their sense of identity and found a haven of safety.  
 
 
Pastor Terry Jones and the Islamic Invasion of the West 
The interpretation of attachment-religion connection in relation to religious 
violence is not peculiar to any religion. Similar patterns of defensive processes 
to attachment disruptions seem to take center stage within Christian circles as 
right-wing conservatives defend and protest for the cause of Christianity—
even to extreme proportions, and often seeing pacifism as an illusion indulged 
by Christians whose own safety is protected by non-pacifists. A good case 
example to illustrate how adherents of the Christian faith may also resort to 
similar protest on the basis of protecting identity or defending an object of 
attachment is the story of Pastor Terry Jones who between 2010 to 2013 
planned on publicly burning 2,998 Korans to mark the anniversary of the 9/11 
attacks and protest the Islamic invasion of the West. In his own words during 
a CNN interview, Jones warns the United States government to ‘Stop Islamic 
migration. They are only coming to this country to enforce ... their Islamic laws 
upon us. We should stop the building of all Mosques in America until they 
allow us to build churches in Saudi Arabia and Iran’ (Jones 2010). In the 
interview, Jones also noted that his intentions were to, 
 
send a message to them that radical Islam, Sharia Law, or what they 
wish to institute for a period of time is not accepted in America …. 
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We also want to send a message to the moderate Muslims to stay 
peaceful and moderate ... but we do not want, as it appears to be in 
some parts of the world, after they gained some numbers in the 
population they begin to push for Sharia Law and that type of 
government ... we expect the Muslims that are here in America to 
respect and honour and obey and submit to our constitution (Jones 
2010). 
 
Jones’ fear of an Islamic invasion may have given rise to his defensive protest 
to burn that which he translates to be a threat to his safe haven and secure 
base in terms of his Christian faith and his country America. The rationale for 
wanting to burn hundreds of Korans, according to Jones, was to demonstrate 
that Islam was a threat to him, his Christian beliefs, and country. This example 
also makes an interesting case for our theory in terms of how defensive 
responses to attachment disruptions in the form of protest may be used to 
explain similar acts of religious violence from within the ranks of the 
Christian faith and in other cultural contexts. It is reasoned that Jones’ pretext 
for burning the Koran also parallels with the reasons why Muslim extremists 
protested the Charlie Hebdo’s caricature of prophet Muhammed and equally 
seems to have semblance with the statement of Boko Haram, even though 
they took it a bit far by taking human lives in their despair phase of defense. 
However, it seems that Jones’ case only demonstrates the protest defensive 
phase in which the individual signals a potential separation distress due to 
threats to the attachment bond, be it in the form of raising placards, slogans, 
threatening an oppressor, or burning that which is sacred to the disruptors. 
Pastor Jones’ case is an example of this moderate demonstration since his 
defenses did not escalate to that of despair which could have translated to 
extremities that are life threatening, as in the two previous case examples. 
This goes to show that despite the reactions to the fear of losing a symbol of 
safety and an attachment identity in religious situations, attachment 
disruptions can be managed at the protest phase, without escalating to the 
extreme despairing phase that may endanger the lives of others.  
 
 
Toward an Attachment-Psychopathological Theory of 
Religious Violence 
In the preceding pages, it was demonstrated that members of a particular  
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political or religious group can develop a collective drive to defend their sense 
of identity and protect the bond they have established with an object of 
attachment or religious figure through their protest, despair and detachment 
mechanisms. When the bond between a religious follower and a religious 
figure comes under the corrupting influence of another group or is perceived 
to be under attack (as seen in the cases of Charlie Hebdo vs al-Qaeda, Boko 
Haram vs the Nigerian government, and Pastor Terry Jones vs Islamic 
radicalisation), this experience can activate adaptive, defensive reactions and 
responses. This form of defensive mechanism is developed as a strategy for 
dealing with the tension associated with losing the attachment bond with a 
religious figure (Kobak et al. 2016), and thus conceptualised as the attachment-
psychopathological interpretation of religious violence. This attachment 
behavioural pattern is similar to Ainsworth et al.’s (1978) anxious and avoidant 
attachment styles in that it is a direct response to caregiver’s responsiveness, 
as the individual develops feelings of insecurity by being fearful of others and 
develop self-nurturing behaviour to avoid others so as to cope with troubling 
emotions. In contrast, this defensive mechanism is not a secure attachment but 
rather an insecure pattern of attachment which might also be another way of 
interpreting Main and Solomon’s (1990) disorganised attachment since it 
exhibits a bit of ambivalent and avoidant tendencies toward other groups, since 
the defender of the caregiver is both distrusting and dismissal of others due to 
the prejudices they have about them, and thus, developing defenses of protest, 
despair, and detachment.  
A defensive attachment mechanism in the form of protest, despair, or 
detachment is the direct response to forces and systems that disrupt an 
attachment process, especially when such forces are perceived to threaten the 
attachment bond binding relational partners. Although it is easier to focus on 
the intensification of feelings and conflicts that give rise to violent religious 
acts as the cause of the problem, it is reasoned that this assumption is only ‘to 
scratch the surface’ and not enough. Religious violence is not always about 
religion, even though religion may serve as the mobilizing identity. There is a 
need to pay close attention to the internal conflicts, sustained attachment 
injuries, psychopathology, and attachment needs of the perpetrators carrying 
out the acts of violence to better understand how defensive responses against 
an opposing group can be by-products of how the human brain processes 
perceived threats, emotions, and worldview defense (cf. Johnson et al. 2012). 
Most importantly, there is also a lot to benefit from examining the nature of 
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this defensive attachment that has now been proposed and how it aligns with 
other broader perspectives of religious violence theory.  
In the case where the individual or group is at the first phase of 
protesting for their attachment bond due to a phenomenon of attachment 
disruption, such individual or group could exhibit dramatic demonstrations that 
only signal a potential separation distress. This distress may be because of not 
being able to monitor the emotionally attuned communication with the 
attachment figure, even though they may still be optimistic about having the 
figure back in their lives. However, when such disruption is severe and 
prolonged it can initiate the second phase of defensive reaction which is the 
despairing stage in which the individual or group loses hope of maintaining 
their attachment bond and thus putting their own lives on the line to revenge 
for their lost attachment. This second phase is where acts of extreme violence 
and terrorism are adopted to make a statement about the hopelessness of losing 
an attachment bond upon which identity is formed, as the individual or group 
becomes alienated from their true values to perpetuate horrific acts of terror 
and violence. In contrast, the detachment phase presents an opportunity for 
dialogue and exploring alternative attachment figures that would fill in the void 
of attachment. In inter-religious contexts, this is where the individual who has 
experienced severe attachment disruptions with a religious figure turns to 
another religious figure for answers and hope. For instance, after exhausting 
the first and second defensive options, a Muslim agitator could find hope and 
peace in another religious attachment figure within or outside of his or her own 
religion as a way of expressing the last phase of defensive response –  
detachment.  
Instead of shying away from the problem of attachment disruption by 
morphing into anxious-ambivalent or anxious-avoidant attachment style as in 
the case of infants, defensive processes in religious attachments demonstrate 
how adults experiencing attachment religious relationships defend their 
religious figure and respond to forces that might want to break the bond shared 
with their sacred objects. Agents of disruption in attachment processes are 
often identifiable due to a variety of factors that contribute to the development 
of prejudice in a person such as one’s internal working models and relationship 
experiences, which predetermine the extent to which an opposing force is seen 
as an attack. Thus, adults who had unhealthy attachments with their primary 
caregivers would often be quick to initiate their defensive attachment 
mechanism as they almost immediately interpret the actions of others as a 
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threat to their sense of identity and attachment. It is therefore plausible to put 
forward that religious violence can arise from attachment insecurity due to the 
need to secure an attachment bond and defend an object of attachment around 
which a sense of identity and security has been built. Hence, it is proposed that 
religious violence could be conceptualised as a way of dealing with what is 
happening in the human minds in terms of emotionally attuned detections of 
attachment disruptions that make religious believers susceptible to vulnerable 
defenses of protest, despair, and detachment, which are initiated to secure the 
attachment bond being formed with a religious object.  
When a group finds a haven of safety in a religious object or in a 
person, it should not come as a surprise when they defend their source of 
security and identity, especially when such a figure, or the bond thereof, is 
being threatened by another group. That some perpetrators of religious 
violence attack another group in retaliation for their external imposition to or 
disruption of their way of life is a theoretical perspective that could be used to 
further conceptualise religious violence as an attachment phenomenon. The 
case examples of Charlie Hebdo versus al-Qaeda, Boko Haram versus the 
Nigerian government, and Pastor Terry Jones essentially depict a picture of 
what adult defensive responses to religious attachment disruptions may look 
like in real-life situations, as the individuals and groups involved carry out acts 
of violence to defend their religious objects of attachment. These protesting 
and despairing groups portray themselves as defenders of a religious figure to 
which the security and identity of their community are framed.  
There are several other broad theoretical perspectives that also point 
to this proposed attachment-psychopathological perspective on religious 
violence. Giddens (1990), for example, refers to this form of defensive 
responses as necessary adaptive reactions for attaining, what he refers to as an 
‘ontological security’, which is an emotional phenomenon rooted in the 
unconscious. When one’s sense of ontological security is threatened, the 
individual develops adaptive reactions to deal effectively with the challenges 
of being in the world. Huntington (1996) on the other hand saw this paradigm 
of disruption as the clash of civilisations, predicting that the dominating source 
of conflict would be the clash of culture of which religion is a mobilizing 
factor. Neumayer and Plumper (2009) also reasoned that acts of religious 
violence and terrorism do not necessarily depend on the prevalence of the 
disruptions as such, but on the strategic benefits of exploiting the weakness of 
an opposing group. Ultimately, when the relatively long-enduring bond 
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between a social group and their object(s) of attachment is disrupted and 
violated, there is bound to be consequences since the object is important as a 
unique symbol and is interchangeable with no other (cf. Ainsworth 1973; 
1989).  
One obvious limitation of this paper is in the choice of three case 
examples which might be a potential weakness for the discourse analysis. 
While this might be a good critique of this paper, Georgaca and Avdi 
(2011:148) contend that ‘discourse analyses often rely on relatively small 
numbers of participants and/or texts, in part due to the fact that analysis is very 
labour-intensive and large amounts of data would be prohibitive’. In addition, 
due to the individual differences in psychological functions, it is likely that the 
presented propositions may not be representative of every case of religious 
violence since research in adult religious psychopathology remain uncharted 
waters. Hence, more empirical investigations are required to strengthen the 
attachment theoretical argument on religious violence, especially ones that 
would represent the three defensive processes in religious attachment 
disruptions. Unfortunately, the texts and discourses used did not provide 
evidence of the detachment phase which might have demonstrated the role of 
defensive processes as an important framework for theorizing inter-religious 
relations. In conclusion, attachment theory provides a platform to interpret acts 
of religious violence and terrorism, as seen in cases cited in this paper, as 
responses to attachment disruptions. This perspective allows us to argue that 
when recipients of attachment moves into defensive modes against an opposing 
group, they circle their wagons for protection from those perceived to be threats 
to their attachment bond, and then move to resolve their vulnerable feelings of 
fear and anxiety for losing a caregiver through their protest, despair, and 
detachment. 
 
  
Conclusion  
The paper provides theoretical insights on how the development of attachment 
transcends early childhood years and can become a lens through which to 
interpret the religious behaviour of adults. Attachment theory was used as an 
alternative theoretical framework for understanding the etiology of religious 
violence; thus, arguing that when a religious figure is experienced as a secure 
base and a safe haven, this salvation can generate into a cumulative allegiance 
and reciprocity toward such symbolic attachment figure. Hence, defensive 
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responses to attachment disruptions that threaten the relationship with the 
figure can be the precursor that increase the risk of adult religious 
psychopathology.  
 It is therefore proposed that religious violence can be reinterpreted as 
the by-product of attachment biological processes and a psychological 
problem, one that is internalised and created when a group or an individual, 
over time, disrupts the attachment process of another group. The organised 
defensive responses to this violation of attachment in the form of protest, 
despair, or detachment is a reasonable form of therapy, albeit a negative one, 
that is used as a reparative process for restoring confidence in the attachment 
bond. The starting point to resolving the issue of religious violence would be 
to amplify the role played by the human brain in creating toxic prejudices and 
expectations from which defensive responses are initiated. To this end, there is 
a need to identify the ways in which attachment disruptions are executed in the 
modern world in order to understand the extent to which we can conceptualise 
and problematize the conflicts that have now been labelled ‘religious’, 
‘political’, and ‘violent’.  
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